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sector in developing countries, and in particular in microfinance institutions. We 
present a simple model of entrepreneurship that aims to explain these two puzzles. 
In the model, entrepreneurship arises from the interaction of ability, access to 
capital and labor investments. To this, we add two social norms that are wide-
spread in developing countries (but not only): women have domestic obligations that 
restrict the time they can dedicate to their businesses (while men do not); and 
women have less access to capital than men. Consequently, women self-select into 
the informal sector since it requires less capital and labor investment. The model 
also indicates that raising entrepreneurial capabilities of time-constrained women 
in just one or two dimensions, like ability (via business training) and capital (via 
business grants), might not be sufficient to promote entrepreneurial success. We 
present evidence that supports these hypotheses using data from a field experiment 
in Tanzania with microfinance clients.
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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze two puzzles on entrepreneurship and gender. First, a number 
of field experiments in developing countries on business training and business grants 
have shown that it is very difficult to raise entrepreneurial outcomes for female 
entrepreneurs. Second, women tend to be over-represented in the informal sector in 
developing countries, and in particular in microfinance institutions. We present a 
simple model of entrepreneurship that aims to explain these two puzzles. In the model, 
entrepreneurship arises from the interaction of ability, access to capital and labor 
investments. To this, we add two social norms that are widespread in developing 
countries (but not only): women have domestic obligations that restrict the time they 
can dedicate to their businesses (while men do not); and women have less access to 
capital than men. Consequently, women self-select into the informal sector since it 
requires less capital and labor investment. The model also indicates that raising 
entrepreneurial capabilities of time-constrained women in just one or ¬two dimensions, 
like ability (via business training) and capital (via business grants), might not be 
sufficient to promote entrepreneurial success. We present evidence that supports these 
hypotheses using data from a field experiment in Tanzania with microfinance clients. 
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1. Introduction 
A central puzzle in the microfinance and entrepreneurship literature is that 
several interventions aiming at stimulating entrepreneurship (such as business 
training and business grants) fail to raise females’ income and business profits, 
much more so than for men1. A closely related puzzle is why females are over 
represented in the informal sector, and in particular in microfinance 
institutions2. 
In this paper, we propose a simple model of entrepreneurship, which can 
contribute to explain both puzzles. In addition, we also present some evidence 
with data from a field experiment with business training and business grants 
in Tanzania, which supports the main findings of the model. 
In particular, we use a standard model of entrepreneurship developed by 
Lucas (1978), and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) 3 . In this model, potential 
entrepreneurship arises from the combination of capital ownership, business 
ability, and labor employment4. Accordingly, individuals with higher business 
ability, more capital, and more labor investment are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs. 
To this standard model, we add two social norms that are prevalent in many 
developing countries. First, women, contrary to men, have domestic 
obligations (like cleaning, cooking, taking care of children), which limit the 
amount of time that they can dedicate to their businesses (including, for 
example, time for business networking). Second, women have access to less 
capital than men, since they have less collateral. Several studies present 
                                                        
1 See for instance, Berge et al. (2014); Field et al. (2010); Drexler et al. (2012); Bruhn and Zia 
(2012); Giné and Mansuri (2011); Karlan and Valdivia (2011); de Mel et al. (2012, 2014); Banerjee 
and Duflo (2011); and Klinger and Schündeln (2011). Oosterbeek et al. (2010) and Huber et al. 
(2014), in turn, look to the effects of business training early in life. 
2 For evidence, see for instance Morduch (1999); Hermes and Lensink (2007); Cull et al. (2009); 
and Rijkers and Costa (2012). 
3 See also Mesnard and Ravallion (2006), and Alby et al. (2013). 
4 Clearly, other factors can affect entrepreneurship as well, such as learning, risk preferences, and 
competitive attitudes. See Jovanovic (1982); Cabral and Mata (2003); Hurst and Lusardi (2004); 
Atolia and Prasad (2011); and Berge et al. (2015). 
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evidence of the pervasiveness of these two social norms in developing 
countries5. 
In addition to gender, we also consider the question of formality and 
informality, since this is central to entrepreneurship in developing countries. In 
this regard, we assume that entrepreneurs have to decide to enter either the 
formal or the informal sector. The difference between the formal and the 
informal sector is that the former requires more capital, it incurs higher 
fixed/entry costs, and pays higher wages than the latter. The empirical evidence 
supports the distinction between the formal and the informal sector along these 
lines6. 
The data used in this paper, as mentioned above, comes from a randomized 
field experiment among small-scale entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
The field experiment was conducted in collaboration with one of the leading 
microfinance institutions in Tanzania, PRIDE. For further information on this 
field experiment, see Berge et al. (2014). A distinguishing feature of this field 
experiment is that it had three treatment effects: business training only; 
business grants only; and business training together with business grants. In 
other words, the field experiment tried to influence two constraints usually 
associated with micro entrepreneurs: business-abilities, and access to capital. 
The theoretical model has a series of predictions that we test with the data 
generated from the field experiment. In particular, the main predictions of the 
model are the following. First, formal entrepreneurs are more able, and 
therefore produce more profits, than informal entrepreneurs. Second, since 
informal entrepreneurs are more capital and ability constrained than formal 
entrepreneurs, interventions that promote entrepreneurs’ access to capital, and 
                                                        
5 See, for instance, Potash (1986); Agarwal (1994); Saito (1994); Udry (1996); Dey-Abbas (1997); 
Johnson (2004); Sen (1990); Dasgupta (1993); Pitt and Khandker (1998); Mammen and Paxson 
(2000); and Van Tassel (2004). 
6 See for instance Boeke (1953); Lewis (1954); Agénor (2005); Mandelman and Montes-Rojas 
(2009); Vollrath (2009); and Fergusson (2013). 
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business ability might have a strong impact on informal entrepreneurs. Third, 
female entrepreneurs self-select into the informal sector 7 . Fourth, female 
entrepreneurs tend to have lower profits than male entrepreneurs. Fifth, 
increasing female entrepreneurs’ access to capital and business ability may not 
improve the profits of their businesses if they are time-constrained due to 
domestic obligations. Conversely, raising access to capital and entrepreneurial 
ability is expected to have large impact amongst female entrepreneurs that are 
not time-constrained.  
To understand why business training and business grants might only have 
an effect on female entrepreneurs that are not time-constrained, note that 
entrepreneurship in our model is made of three dimensions, capital investment, 
ability, and labor investment. If only two of these dimensions are lifted, let us 
say ability (via business training) and capital (via business grants), female 
entrepreneurs that are time-constrained might still not be able to grow. 
The data from the field experiment confirms the main predictions of the 
theoretical model. In particular, we find that the business training and the 
business grant have no impact for time-constrained female entrepreneurs. On 
the other hand, the business training and the business grant do have a positive 
impact for female entrepreneurs that are not time-constrained8. Furthermore, 
we find that, irrespective of gender, the intervention has seemingly a larger 
impact on informal entrepreneurs than on formal entrepreneurs. Accordingly, 
since informal entrepreneurs have potentially larger restrains in terms of access 
                                                        
7  Emran et al. (2006) present an alternative explanation for why women self-select into the 
informal sector (in particular microfinance): missing labor markets for women. Accordingly, since 
women suffer discrimination in the formal labor market, they have no other choice than working 
or being entrepreneurs in the informal sector. 
8 The importance of time constraints on entrepreneurship has been somewhat neglected in the 
literature. There are some notable exceptions, however. See for instance, Bolton and Dewatripont 
(1994) for theory; and Bandiera et al. (2007, 2011a,b) and Bloom et al. (2011) for empirical 
evidence. Note however, that our results differ from those in Fafchamps et al. (2014). Fafchamps 
et al. (2014) find that a business grant only had impact on the female entrepreneurs that already 
had higher profits at the start of the intervention. In turn, we find that a business grant and 
business training only have an impact on female entrepreneurs that are not time-constrained. 
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to capital and ability than formal entrepreneurs, business training and business 
grants can have a larger effect on them than on formal entrepreneurs. 
In this sense, our results have policy implications. Reducing capital and 
business knowledge constraints of women in developing countries might not 
be sufficient to promote successful female entrepreneurship in these countries. 
If possible, development interventions aiming to promote female 
entrepreneurship should also target social norms, like the burden of domestic 
obligations that fall on women, since these limit their capacity and potential as 
entrepreneurs9. Another implication is that entrepreneurial interventions on 
business ability and access to capital should target younger females, since they 
are more likely not to have settled too deeply into existing gender-roles. 
Similarly, interventions on business ability and access to capital should focus 
more on informal entrepreneurs given that they face larger constrains than 
formal entrepreneurs and the potential impact of these interventions can 
therefore be larger, especially for the higher ability informal entrepreneurs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
introduce the base model and its main implications. We then present data from 
the field experiment. In section 3, we discuss the empirical strategy. In section 
4, we present the results from our study. In section 5, we draw the main 
conclusions. 
2. The Model 
We model an economy with two sectors, the formal sector (𝐹 ) and the 
informal sector (𝐼). As we have argued in the introduction, this type of dual 
economy is very pervasive in many developing countries. The sector of activity 
                                                        
9  McMullen (2011) defend that a market based approach to entrepreneurs in development 
countries needs to be complemented with institutional and cultural interventions. This diagnostic 
seems to be in accordance with our results. Alvarez and Barney (2014), also highlight that 
entrepreneurial activities are context dependent. As a result, entrepreneurial development 
interventions need to be tailored to each specific context. 
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is indicated by a subscript 𝑠, with 𝑠 = 𝐹, 𝐼. We divide potential entrepreneurs 
according to gender, man (𝑀 ) and woman (𝑊 ). Gender is indicated by a 
subscript 𝑖, with 𝑖 = 𝑀, 𝑊. Each potential entrepreneur has an ability level . In 
the following, we consider a set of socio-cultural norms that are common in 
many developing countries. 
Socio-cultural norm 1: women have to work at home (for example, taking 
care of children, cleaning the house, cooking, shopping), while men have no 
domestic obligations. We assume that this socio-cultural norm implies that 
women can dedicate less time to their businesses. We denote 𝐿𝑖 the amount of 
labor supplied by entrepreneur 𝑖, with 𝑖 = 𝑀, 𝑊. We assume that 𝐿𝑀 > 𝐿𝑊. 
Socio-cultural norm 2: men have access to more capital than women. This 
may result from the fact that men have more collateral and consequently have 
access to more capital from financial institutions. In turn, women have less 
collateral and have to recur, for instance, to microfinance institutions. We 
denote 𝐾𝑖 the amount of labor supplied by entrepreneur 𝑖, with 𝑖 = 𝑀, 𝑊. We 
then assume that 𝐾𝑀 > 𝐾𝑊. 
In addition to these two social norms, we also make a series of assumptions 
related to the dual economy, formal versus informal. 
Assumption 1: the formal sector has higher fixed costs than the informal 
sector. It is acknowledged, for instance, that the formal sector pays higher taxes 
and requires (costly) licenses to start a business. We denote 𝑇𝑠 as the fixed costs 
in sector s, with 𝑠 = 𝐹, 𝐼. We therefore have that 𝑇𝐹 > 𝑇𝐼 . Consequently, there 
are higher barriers to entry in the formal sector. 
    Assumption 2: the formal sector requires more capital than the informal 
sector. This is so because the formal sector is more technologically advanced 
and is more capital intensive. We then have that 𝐾𝐹 > 𝐾𝐼. As a result, in order 
to enter the formal sector, an entrepreneur needs to have access to more capital 
than an entrepreneur in the informal sector. 
    Assumption 3: wages in the formal sector are higher than wages in the 
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informal sector. We denote 𝑤𝑠 as the wages in sector s, with 𝑠 = 𝐹. 𝐼. In this 
way, we have that 𝑤𝐹 > 𝑤𝐼 . Evidence shows that this is usually the case in 
many developing countries (Fields, 2011). 
The production function in sector 𝑠  ( 𝑠 = 𝐹, 𝐼 ) of a firm owned by an 
entrepreneur 𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝑀, 𝑊) with ability 𝜃 equals: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠 = 𝜃𝑖𝑠(𝐾𝑖𝑠)
𝛼(𝐿𝑖𝑠)
1−𝛼,  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛼 ∈ (0,1)      (1) 
Profits of entrepreneur 𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝑀, 𝑊) in sector 𝑠 (𝑠 = 𝐹, 𝐼): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝜋𝑖𝑠 = 𝜃𝑖𝑠(𝐾𝑖𝑠)
𝛼(𝐿𝑖𝑠)
1−𝛼 − 𝑤𝑠𝐿𝑖𝑠 − 𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑖𝑠 − 𝑇𝑠    (2) 
Where r represents the price of one unit of capital. 
The first order condition (FOC) in relation to labor investments (𝐿𝑖) equals: 
𝑑𝜋𝑖𝑠
𝑑𝐿𝑖𝑠
=
(1−𝛼)𝜃𝑖𝑠𝐾𝑖𝑠
𝐿𝑖𝑠
𝛼 − 𝑤𝑠        (3) 
Moreover, the second order condition (SOC) equals: 
𝑑(𝜋𝑖𝑠)
2
𝑑2𝐿𝑖𝑠
= −
(1−𝛼)𝜃𝑖𝑠𝐾𝑖𝑠
𝛼
𝐿𝑖𝑠
1+𝛼 < 0       (4) 
As such, the SOC is always satisfied. 
Solving equation (3) for 𝐿𝑖𝑠, we obtain: 
𝐿𝑖𝑠 = (
(1−𝛼)𝜃𝑖𝑠
𝑤𝑠
)
1
𝛼
𝐾𝑖𝑠         (5) 
Substituting in the profit expression, we get: 
𝜋𝑖𝑠 =
𝛼
1−𝛼
((
(1−𝛼)𝜃𝑖𝑠
𝑤𝑖𝑠
1−𝛼 )
1
𝛼
− 𝑟) 𝐾𝑖𝑠 − 𝑇𝑠      (6) 
In the next section, we evaluate the consequences for entrepreneurship of 
the model above. 
3. Implications of the model 
In this section, we examine the effects on entrepreneurship of the two social 
norms assumed in the theoretical model. We can see that an individual 𝑖, with 
𝑖 = 𝑀, 𝑊 , becomes entrepreneur in sector 𝑠 , with 𝑠 = 𝐹, 𝐼 , if 𝜋𝑖𝑠 > 𝑤𝑠 , i.e.: if 
he/she earns more as an entrepreneur than as a wage earner. Solving for 
equation 𝜋𝑖𝑠 > 𝑤𝑠 for 𝜃𝑖𝑠, we have that the threshold level of productivity that 
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makes it profitable for an individual to become an entrepreneur in sector 𝑠, 
with 𝑠 = 𝐹, 𝐼, is: 
𝜃𝑖𝑠 = (
𝑤𝑠+𝑇𝑠+𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑖𝑠
𝐾𝑖𝑠
)
𝛼 𝑤𝑠
1−𝛼
𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼)1−𝛼
       (7) 
The threshold value of ability (𝜃𝑖𝑠) in equation (7) varies with gender and 
sector of activity. We can now compare the different threshold values of ability 
(𝜃𝑖𝑠) that make it profitable for an individual to become an entrepreneur. We 
can look at this from two perspectives: formal versus informal (keeping gender 
constant); and men versus women (keeping sector of activity constant). In the 
following, we assume that 𝑟 = 𝑟𝐹 = 𝑟𝐼, given that we have no prior knowledge 
about the interest rate in the formal and the informal sector10.  
The difference between the threshold levels of productivity for the formal 
and the informal sector (keeping gender constant) equals: 
𝜃𝑖𝐹 − 𝜃𝑖𝐼 =
1
𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼)1−𝛼
[(
𝑤𝐹+𝑇𝐹+𝑟𝐾𝑖𝐹
𝐾𝑖𝐹
)
𝛼
𝑤𝐹
1−𝛼 − (
𝑤𝐼+𝑇𝐼+𝑟𝐾𝑖𝐼
𝐾𝑖𝐼
)
𝛼
𝑤𝐼
1−𝛼] > 0 (8) 
Since 𝑤𝐹 > 𝑤𝐼 , 𝑇𝐹 > 𝑇𝐼 , and 𝐾𝐹 > 𝐾𝐼  , then 𝜃𝑖𝐹 > 𝜃𝑖𝐼 . In other words, 
entrepreneurs in the formal sector need to have higher ability. This can be seen 
more clearly in figure 1. For a given level of access to capital, entrepreneurs in 
the formal sector need to have higher productivity than entrepreneurs in the 
informal sector. This means that entrepreneurs with higher productivity self-
select into the formal sector. 
First implication of the model. Formal entrepreneurs are more able and can 
therefore generate more profits than informal entrepreneurs. 
Second implication of the model. Since informal entrepreneurs are more 
constrained in terms of access to capital and ability, interventions that target 
these two constraints should have larger effects on informal entrepreneurs than 
on formal entrepreneurs. 
In turn, the difference between the threshold levels of productivity for male 
                                                        
10 Cull et al. (2009) and Sun and Im (2015) report cases of microfinance institutions with very high 
interest rates. This could indicate that interest rates in the informal financial sector are higher than 
in the formal financial sector. Note that if this is the case, the results in our model are strengthened. 
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and female entrepreneurs (keeping sector constant) equals: 
𝜃𝑀𝑠 − 𝜃𝑊𝑠 =
𝑤𝑠
1−𝛼
𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼)1−𝛼
[(
𝑤𝑠+𝑇𝑠
𝐾𝑀𝑠
+ 𝑟)
𝛼
− (
𝑤𝑠+𝑇𝑠
𝐾𝐹𝑠
+ 𝑟)
𝛼
] < 0   (9) 
Since 𝐾𝑀 > 𝐾𝑊 , then 𝜃𝑀𝑠 < 𝜃𝑊𝑠. In other words, male entrepreneurs do not 
need have as high ability as female entrepreneurs. The reason for this is that 
males are not time-constrained. Figure 2 shows the gender effects of our model: 
for a given level of access to capital, female entrepreneurs need to have higher 
productivity than male entrepreneurs. Similarly, for a given level of 
entrepreneurial ability, female entrepreneurs need to have access to higher 
levels of capital. As a result, female entrepreneurs find it more difficult to enter 
the formal sector. 
Third implication of the model. Female entrepreneurs self-select, and are 
therefore over-represented, into the informal sector.  
Fourth implication of the model. Female entrepreneurs tend to have lower 
profits than male entrepreneurs.  
Fifth implication of the model. Since female entrepreneurs are constrained 
in terms of both access to capital and the time dedicated to their businesses, 
interventions that target entrepreneurs’ access to capital and ability might not 
have any effect on female entrepreneurs. However, for female entrepreneurs 
that are not time-constrained, these interventions can have a positive impact. 
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Figure 1: Threshold Level of Productivity: Formal versus Informal 
 
Figure 2: Threshold Level of Productivity: Men versus Women 
 
 
Next, we proceed to the empirical part of the paper. We start by presenting 
the data and then test empirically the main implications of the model. 
4.  Sample and data 
The data we use in the empirical part was obtained from a field experiment 
with business training and business grants conduced in Dar es Salaam, 
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Tanzania. In this field experiment, some entrepreneurs received business 
training, others a business grant, and the others both business training and a 
business grant. The control group received neither a business grant nor 
business training. Berge et al. (2014) explain this field experiment in detail.  
In this paper, we use the same sample as in Berge et al. (2014) of 644 small-
scale entrepreneurs all members of one of the leading microfinance institutions 
in the country, PRIDE. Most of these entrepreneurs are involved in small-scale 
commerce (running a small kiosk, having a stall at the market) or different sorts 
of service activities (hairdressing, small restaurants), with a few also involved 
in light manufacturing (tailoring, carpentry, brick making) or agriculture.  
The clients in PRIDE are organized in loan groups of five entrepreneurs, 
and 10 loan groups make up a “market enterprise” group. All members of the 
market enterprise group are jointly responsible for each others’ loans in the 
microfinance institution, in the case of someone’s default. There are 349 loan 
groups represented in our sample. The control group in our sample (the 
entrepreneurs that received no business training nor business grants) consists 
of 199 individuals. In turn, 193 entrepreneurs received business training only, 
126 were offered the business grant only, and 126 received both treatments 
(business grant plus business training). 
5. Empirical strategy 
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy. We first look at a set of 
variables related to entrepreneurial activity on the sample analyzed. For 
instance, we study sales, profits, number of businesses, formality of the 
business, sector of activity, number of employees, loans, investments, business 
practices (like record keeping, marketing), business knowledge, working hours, 
age, education, and business contacts. We analyze this data from the prism of 
gender and formality. In other words, we look at whether male and female 
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entrepreneurs differ along these dimensions and do the same for formal and 
informal entrepreneurs. 
We then examine what business variables are correlated with profits and 
other business outcomes and choices (such as investments, loans, working 
hours, business knowledge, education, and formality). We do this analysis 
again for male and female entrepreneurs and for formal and informal 
entrepreneurs. 
The last exercise we perform is to look at the experimental evidence. In 
particular, we regress profits on the treatment variables. As we have discussed 
above, there are three treatments: business grant only; business training only; 
and business grant plus business training. We then consider the effect of 
treatment when it is interacted on the one hand with the number of working 
hours, and on the other hand when it is interacted with formality. 
6. Results 
In this section, we report the empirical results in the paper. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics in terms of gender (left side) and formality 
(right side). We can see that some statistically significant differences arise 
between female and male entrepreneurs. Male entrepreneurs compared to 
female entrepreneurs have higher sales, higher profits, are more likely to run 
formal businesses, are less likely to run informal businesses, are less likely to 
work in services, are more likely to work in manufacturing, have higher 
business knowledge, have lower education, and work more hours.  
The descriptive statistics in relation to gender are then mostly in 
accordance with the assumptions and the implications of the theoretical model. 
In fact the variable working hours shows that male entrepreneurs tend to work 
on average about one day more a week than female entrepreneurs. The 
summary statistics also confirms the third and fourth implications in our model, 
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namely that female entrepreneurs are over-represented in the informal sector 
and that female entrepreneurs have lower profits than male entrepreneurs. 
In terms of formality, we have the following statistically significant 
differences. Compared to entrepreneurs that run informal businesses, 
entrepreneurs that have formal businesses have higher sales, higher profits, 
more employees, higher loans, higher investments, are more likely to keep 
business records, have longer working hours and have higher levels of 
education.  
Again, these descriptive statistics in terms of formality are also in 
accordance with both the assumptions and the implications of the theoretical 
model. First, as we assume in the theoretical model, formal entrepreneurs have 
more access to capital than informal entrepreneurs. Second, as shown by the 
first prediction from the theoretical model, formal entrepreneurs generate more 
profits than informal entrepreneurs, possibly due to the former having higher 
ability, as demonstrated by the fact that they have higher education. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by gender and formality 
  Means p-values  Means   p-values 
  Female Male 
Female=          
Male 
  Informal Formal 
Formal= 
Informal 
Sales 2187.64 3062.518 0.01  2148.815 3692.660 0.00 
Profit 531436 618.217 0.03  520.657 705.213 0.00 
Businesses 1.547 1.527 0.7  1.528 1.585 0.36 
Formal Businesses 0.315 0.22 0.05  0 1.148 0.00 
Informal Businesses 1.327 1.212 0.08  1.528 0.437 0.00 
Commerce 0.697 0.703 0.88  0.703 0.683 0.64 
Service 0.441 0.257 0  0.376 0.38 0.94 
Manufacturing 0.111 0.234 0  0.147 0.176 0.42 
Employees 1.033 1.18 0.28  0.972 1.479 0.00 
PRIDE loan 772.275 766.667 0.78  759.363 809.155 0.03 
Investments 172.177 249.937 0.11  168.802 305.68 0.01 
Record keeping 0.661 0.667 0.89  0.631 0.775 0.00 
License 0.171 0.207 0.29  0 0.831 0.00 
Marketing  0.485 0.498 0.57  1.442 1.563 0.16 
Business knowledge 0.694 0.722 0.04  0.704 0.704 0.98 
Working hours 59.483 67.919 0  60.127 70.394 0.00 
Age 37.924 37.302 0.4  37.807 37.366 0.57 
Education 8.04 7.734 0.07  5.297 4.479 0.01 
Business contacts 1.038 17.514 0   12.518 12.958 0.83 
Observations 422 222   502 142  
Note: The table reports average values from the baseline survey in 2008 for all entrepreneurs in the 
survey (644 observations), by gender. p-value is from a two-sided t-test of equality. Sales: Monthly sales, 
in thousand TZS. Profit: Monthly profit, in thousand TZS. Businesses: No. of businesses. Commerce, 
Service, and Manufacturing: Share of clients involved in each of these sectors. Employees: Number of 
employees. PRIDE loan: Size of loan in PRIDE, in thousand TZS. Investments: Business investments 
during the last year, excluding additions to stocks, in thousand TZS. Net borrower: Indicator variable 
taking the value one if the sum of all loans is larger than all savings. Record keeping: Indicator variable 
taking the value one if the entrepreneur reports keeping records. License: Indicator variable taking the 
value one if at least one of the businesses is licensed. Marketing: An index of marketing initiatives during 
the last year, from zero (no initiatives) to one (initiatives on three dimensions). Business knowledge: Test 
of business skills, share of correct answers. Working hours: Working hours per week. Age: The age of the 
entrepreneur, in number of years. Education: Number of years of schooling. Muslim: Indicator variable 
taking the value one if the entrepreneur is Muslim. 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation between profits and a set of business 
indicators and business characteristics. We show these correlations for the 
whole sample (column (1)), divided by gender (columns (3) and (4)), and 
divided by formal status (columns (5) and (6)).  
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For the whole sample (column (1)), we can see that profits are positively 
and statistically significant correlated with investments, loans, level of service, 
commerce as sector of activity, working hours, number of employees, formal 
sector, and male entrepreneurs. If we look at the female entrepreneurs (column 
(2)), we have that the same pattern holds, with the exception of formality that 
is now not statistically significant. In turn, for male entrepreneurs (column (3)) 
the same pattern holds with the exception of investments that are now not 
statistically significant, service that is now negative but statistically 
insignificant, business knowledge that is now statistically significant with a 
positive impact on profits, and working hours that are now not statistically 
significant. This last result seems worth highlighting, since it shows that male 
entrepreneurs, contrary to female entrepreneurs, are clearly not time-
constrained.  
In terms of formality, we have the following. For formal entrepreneurs 
(column (4)), the following variables have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on profits: loans, service and commerce sectors, number of employees, 
and level of education. In turn, there is a negative and statistically significant 
correlation between profits and female entrepreneurs. For informal 
entrepreneurs (column (5)), the same pattern arises with the exception that now 
investments have a positive and statistically significant effect, the service sector 
is no longer statistically significant, working hours have now a positive and 
statistically significant impact, which is also the case for business knowledge 
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Table 2: Correlates of Profits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Profit Profit, 
Females 
Profit, 
Males 
Profit, Formal 
Entrepreneurs 
Profit, Informal 
Entrepreneurs 
Investments 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRIDE-Loan 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Service 0.136** 0.177** -0.007 0.264* 0.093 
 (0.065) (0.080) (0.127) (0.151) (0.072) 
Commerce 0.471*** 0.437*** 0.516*** 0.568*** 0.437*** 
 (0.074) (0.090) (0.125) (0.167) (0.080) 
Working 
Hours 
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 -0.003 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Employees 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.112*** 0.134*** 
 (0.030) (0.041) (0.036) (0.033) (0.038) 
Education 0.010 0.005 0.015 0.053** -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012) 
Business 
Knowledge 
0.241 0.077 0.516* -0.246 0.367* 
 (0.181) (0.225) (0.300) (0.401) (0.200) 
Formal 0.176** 0.097 0.293***   
 (0.071) (0.093) (0.110)   
Female -0.107*   -0.293** -0.044 
 (0.061)   (0.132) (0.070) 
Constant 11.635*** 11.701*** 11.397*** 12.417*** 11.508*** 
 (0.210) (0.239) (0.381) (0.465) (0.223) 
Observations 644 422 222 142 502 
R2 0.189 0.166 0.254 0.256 0.177 
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Table 3 presents other correlates of business practices, besides those 
related to profits11. We can see that investment is positively and statistically 
significant correlated with having a formal activity, being active in the service 
sector, having more employees, and being a male entrepreneur. In turn, loans 
are positively and statistically significant correlated with having a formal 
activity and working fewer hours (showing substitutability between capital 
and labor). Working hours are positively and statistically significant correlated 
with formal activity, lower loans (again showing substitutability between 
capital and labor), being active in the service sector, having more years of 
education, and being a male entrepreneur. Business knowledge, in turn, is 
negatively and statistically significant correlated with being active in the 
commerce sector, level of education, and being a female entrepreneur. 
Education is negatively and statistically significant correlated with the formal 
sector, being active in the service sector, and business knowledge, but 
positively and statistically significantly correlated with working hours. Finally, 
formality is positively and statistically significantly correlated with loans, 
investments, working hours, and negatively and statistically significantly 
correlated with the service sector, and the level of education. 
  
                                                        
11 In appendix, we show the correlates of working hours by gender. 
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Table 3: Correlates of Business Practices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Investment PRIDE-
Loan 
Working 
Hours 
Business 
Knowledge 
Education Formal 
Formal 92.739* 52.172** 11.830*** -0.015 -0.943***  
 (50.309) (24.006) (2.723) (0.015) (0.294)  
PRIDE-Loan 0.052  -0.009** 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.092)  (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Service 140.577** 27.692 10.376*** -0.010 -0.515* -0.067* 
 (62.317) (21.679) (2.640) (0.015) (0.284) (0.038) 
Commerce -27.643 37.043 3.812 -0.038** -0.139 -0.017 
 (59.721) (22.677) (2.503) (0.015) (0.256) (0.038) 
Working Hours 0.005 -0.702**  0.000 0.013*** 0.003*** 
 (0.969) (0.350)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) 
Employees 56.166** 4.936 -0.973 0.006 0.030 0.031** 
 (26.278) (6.682) (0.619) (0.005) (0.066) (0.013) 
Education -8.171 -1.695 1.326*** -0.007***  -
0.021*** 
 (9.360) (3.600) (0.426) (0.002)  (0.006) 
Business 
Knowledge 
-58.379 92.019 9.166  -1.985*** -0.096 
 (127.695) (62.792) (6.553)  (0.681) (0.100) 
Female -96.866* 0.457 -9.128*** -0.027* -0.308 -0.010 
 (54.446) (21.510) (2.349) (0.014) (0.245) (0.036) 
Investments  0.011 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
  (0.021) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 189.970 702.270*** 54.024*** 0.734*** 6.575*** 0.116 
 (175.139) (60.378) (7.479) (0.033) (0.694) (0.113) 
Observations 644 644 644 644 644 644 
R2 0.082 0.025 0.087 0.040 0.058 0.076 
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We now present some experimental evidence using the theoretical 
model as guidance. In particular, we focus on the second and fifth implications 
of the theoretical model. The second implication of the model says that we 
should expect interventions that improve entrepreneurs’ access to capital and 
ability to have a strong impact on the informal sector. The fifth implication of 
the model, in turn, says that such interventions might not have any impact on 
time-constrained females. However, for females that are not time-constrained 
the intervention can even have a strong impact.  
We start by looking to the fifth implication. Table 4 shows treatment 
effects for the full sample (column (1)), as in Berge et al. (2014). In turn, columns 
(2) to (7) show treatment effects according to the working hours that 
entrepreneurs dedicate to their businesses. We can see that for the full sample 
the intervention only had an impact for male entrepreneurs that received both 
the business grant and the business training. In turn for female entrepreneurs 
there was no impact. The same result is true for entrepreneurs that work more 
than 30 hours, 40 hours, and 60 hours a week. However, for entrepreneurs that 
work more than 70 hours a week the impact of the business training and 
business grant is similar for male entrepreneurs and female entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, for entrepreneurs that work more than 80 hours a week the result is 
reverse in the sense that now there are no statistically significantly effects for 
male entrepreneurs but there are positive, large, and statistically significant 
effects on female entrepreneurs. This shows that for female entrepreneurs that 
are not time-constrained, business training and business grants can have a 
positive and large impact.  
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Table 4: Treatment Impacts and Working Hours  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Original 
Estimates  
Working 
Hours 
>30 
Working 
Hours 
>40 
Working 
Hours 
>50 
Working 
Hours 
>60 
Working 
Hours 
>70 
Working 
Hours 
>80 
Training & Male 0.128 0.079 0.062 0.020 0.024 0.083 -0.127 
 (0.147) (0.155) (0.163) (0.194) (0.223) (0.257) (0.356) 
Grant & Male 0.080 0.038 0.079 0.105 0.195 0.085 0.006 
 (0.140) (0.147) (0.148) (0.167) (0.176) (0.261) (0.332) 
Training + Grant 
& Male 
0.501*** 0.418** 0.317* 0.284 0.462** 0.513* 0.513 
(0.168) (0.184) (0.190) (0.205) (0.224) (0.267) (0.317) 
Training & 
Female 
0.035 0.065 0.040 0.010 0.031 0.072 0.215 
 (0.121) (0.134) (0.135) (0.153) (0.164) (0.187) (0.230) 
Grant & Female 0.072 0.265* 0.269* 0.079 0.187 0.074 0.312 
 (0.132) (0.136) (0.138) (0.147) (0.170) (0.189) (0.245) 
Training + Grant 
& Female 
0.059 0.169 0.171 0.135 0.262 0.433* 0.742*** 
(0.132) (0.148) (0.155) (0.170) (0.206) (0.220) (0.268) 
Observations 602 511 472 399 333 266 187 
R2 0.241 0.243 0.278 0.319 0.349 0.331 0.400 
 
Table 5, in turn, shows the impact of the intervention based on formality. 
We can see that for the full sample the business training and the business grant 
have a positive and statistically significant impact. However, if we divide the 
sample between the entrepreneurs that are formal and informal, we have that 
the intervention only has a positive and statistically significant effect for 
informal entrepreneurs. This shows, as predicted by our model, that the 
intervention is more valuable for the entrepreneurs that are more capital and 
ability constrained. 
 
Table 5: Treatment Impacts and Formality  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample Informal 
Entrepreneurs 
Formal 
Entrepreneurs 
Training 0.092 0.088 0.074 
 (0.094) (0.106) (0.217) 
Grant 0.089 0.085 0.065 
 (0.101) (0.121) (0.235) 
Training + Grant 0.194* 0.242** 0.034 
 (0.102) (0.117) (0.220) 
Observations 602 464 138 
R2 0.191 0.185 0.264 
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7. Concluding remarks  
 
In this paper, we have presented an entrepreneurship model where 
entrepreneurship is made up of three dimensions: capital investment, ability, 
and labor investment. We show that when entrepreneurs are constrained along 
these dimensions and only two of these dimensions are lifted, say ability (via 
business training) and capital (via business grants), entrepreneurs that are 
time-constrained might still not be able to growth. 
We then argue that in many (but not only) developing countries, female 
entrepreneurs are often constrained with respect to the time they can dedicate 
to their businesses, due in particular to domestic obligations. 
We then present some evidence that confirms the main predictions of the 
theoretical model. In particular, using experimental evidence from an 
intervention in a microfinance institution in Tanzania, we show that business 
training and business grants only had a positive impact on women if they were 
not time-constrained. 
The question that arises is whether female entrepreneurs that are not time-
constrained are essentially different from female entrepreneurs that are time-
constrained. We may think, for example, that the more motivated female 
entrepreneurs self-select into being non-time-constrained female entrepreneurs. 
In this situation, these non-time-constrained female entrepreneurs could be 
label as high power female entrepreneurs, while the time-constrained female 
entrepreneurs could be labeled as survival female entrepreneurs. Alternatively, 
it can be argued that the female entrepreneurs that are not time-constrained 
simply do not face these restrictions. For instance, it might be the case that 
female entrepreneurs that are not time-constrained are not married, or do not 
have children, or that their household is quite equal in terms of gender rights. 
Also, our empirical results show that entrepreneurial intervention can have 
large effects on informal entrepreneurs, since these are more constrained in 
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terms of access to capital and business ability. The question of self-selection 
arises, however, once again. Is it so that formal entrepreneurs are more 
motivated, or that informal entrepreneurs face constrains that are very difficult 
to overcome? Answering these questions is central to promoting 
entrepreneurship in developing countries, and we believe that this represents 
opportunities and challenges for future work. 
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8. Appendix 
 
Table A1. Hours – by gender 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Hours Hours 
Female sample 
Hours 
Male Sample 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Dummy if at least one bus. has a license 08 9.284*** 11.256*** 5.973 
 (2.972) (3.904) (4.326) 
Investments08(in 1000TZS) 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Loan at PRIDE 08(in 1000 TZS) -0.009* -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Dummy for service bus.08 9.870*** 11.505*** 7.119 
 (2.700) (3.361) (4.401) 
Dummy for commerce bus.08 3.769 5.301 1.359 
 (2.552) (3.466) (3.967) 
No. of paid employees08 -0.896 -0.895 -0.848 
 (0.634) (0.694) (1.372) 
Years of education -0.808 -0.937 -0.515 
 (0.602) (0.735) (1.048) 
Business Knowledge08 8.411 15.581* -1.675 
 (6.741) (8.740) (10.493) 
Female -9.486***   
 (2.384)   
Constant 68.745*** 52.817*** 76.796*** 
 (7.263) (8.841) (11.941) 
Observations 644 422 222 
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Gender, Social Norms,  
and Entrepreneurship 
Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge
Armando Jose Garcia Pires
In this paper, we analyze two puzzles on entrepreneurship and gender. First, a num-
ber of field experiments in developing countries on business training and business 
grants have shown that it is very difficult to raise entrepreneurial outcomes for 
female entrepreneurs. Second, women tend to be over-represented in the informal 
sector in developing countries, and in particular in microfinance institutions. We 
present a simple model of entrepreneurship that aims to explain these two puzzles. 
In the model, entrepreneurship arises from the interaction of ability, access to 
capital and labor investments. To this, we add two social norms that are wide-
spread in developing countries (but not only): women have domestic obligations that 
restrict the time they can dedicate to their businesses (while men do not); and 
women have less access to capital than men. Consequently, women self-select into 
the informal sector since it requires less capital and labor investment. The model 
also indicates that raising entrepreneurial capabilities of time-constrained women 
in just one or two dimensions, like ability (via business training) and capital (via 
business grants), might not be sufficient to promote entrepreneurial success. We 
present evidence that supports these hypotheses using data from a field experiment 
in Tanzania with microfinance clients.
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